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ABSTRACT
Photography as the Writing of Light
Olgu Aytaç
M.RA. in Graphical Arts
Supervisor: Assist. Prof. Dr. Lewis Keir Johnson 
June 2000
The purpose of this study is to investigate certain critical approaches to 
photography and to try to make a re-reading of photographic images, with 
pursuing some of the reading strategies that French philosopher Jacques 
Derrida employs in deconstruction. The major aim is to point out the intrinsic 
features of photographic images which have been foreclosed most of the 
time, by the discourses established upon it and to trace a possible 
framework for the experience of images.
Keywords: Photography, transparency, reality, deconstruction, death, 
punctum.
ÖZET
Işığın Yazısı Olarak Fotoğraf
Olgu Aytaç
Grafik Tasarım Bölümü 
Yüksek Lisans
Tez Yöneticisi: Yard. Doç. Dr. Lewis Johnson 
June, 2000
Bu çalışmada, fotografik imgeleme ilişkin birtakım eleştirel söylemlerin 
araştırması yapılıp, Fransız filozof Jacques Derrida'nın öne sürdüğü 
yapıbozumcu okuma stratejileri yardımıyla fotoğraf imgesinin olası bir 
yeniden okuması sunulmaya çalışılmıştır. Asıl amaç, fotoğrafik imgenin, çoğu 
zaman kategorik sınıflandırmalar ya da sözü geçen söylemler tarafından 
gözardı edilen içsel özelliklerinin izini sürerek, imgenin deneyimi hakkında 
ipuçları vermektir.
Anahtar sözcükler: Fotoğraf, saydamlık, gerçeklik, ölüm, yapıbozum, 
"punctum."
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INTRODUCTION
Starting from its early days of invention, the debates that have 
effectively shaped the theories on photography hinge around the capabilities 
of the medium, how it changed the orders of representation, what differences 
it brought to the social world, etc. The common ground from which most of 
these debates flourish from is the belief that photographic images provide us 
with a direct, unmediated relation with the things they render visible. The 
invention of camera marks a critical point in the history of representation 
because of the introduction of an impersonal, non-living instrument between 
the object and its image. Depending on the fact that in photography, things, 
events, people leave their traces on the photosensitive material, a notion of 
transparency has been attributed to the medium. In this sense, camera 
becomes a self-effacing instrument, giving way to an objective recording of 
the world through which the captured "reality" speaks directly to the viewer.
Photographs, in the first instance, reproduce the visible world in a 
perfectly realistic manner. The image's relation to its referent here, is 
understood in terms of resemblance and analogy. Camera is taken as an
extension of human body, imitating and even improving the capabilities of the
eye. In this framework, photographs are regarded as trustworthy replicas of 
world's reality. At the same time, while photographic images contribute to the 
reproduction of reality, they impose their own illusionary reality onto the 
world. As it is tried be explained in the first chapter, Susan Sontag's account 
on photography lead us to the argument that with the technological image 
production, the "real-world" has been duplicated and transformed into an 
"image-world." The constitutive aspects of technological media are important 
to understand its impacts on the cultural, social milieu.
The notion of transparency of photographic images has been 
celebrated for conveying the truth of the event that had taken place before 
the camera, or devalued for the elimination of the artistic creativity from the 
artwork. It should be pointed out that the uses of photography are not limited 
within any confined realms. And the consequences of the effect of 
transparency differs from one context to another. However, the common 
matrix that underwrites these discourses is the valorization of the visible in 
Western culture. Photographs, being the result of a chemical process instead 
of a creative one, open the way for an investigation of entities by means of 
their visible aspects.
In the domain of science, photography can serve as a means of inquiry 
and discovery, owing to its objectivity. In a somewhat similar manner, the use 
of photographs in magazines and newspapers is to convey the reader the 
reality of some event. When the sphere of art is concerned, the
instrumentality of the camera suggests that it offers the eye a certain way of 
seeing things. In this case, the qualities of the scene depicted gains primacy 
over how the vision is constructed. Following the transparency effect in this 
sense, would lead us to say that neither the camera nor the photographer can 
make a decisive change in the resulting image; if the thing were different, the 
picture would consequently be different. However, this remark does not simply 
suggest that such notions can easily be dismissed for the sake of their 
opposites. Of course, the transparency of the medium is one of the major 
concepts that needs to be analyzed further since we cannot simply ignore the 
fact that photography is the writing of light.
Throughout the history of photography, a number of dichotomous 
terms shaped the discourses established on the subject matter. Photographic 
images are regarded as products of "culture", while maintaining their close 
relation to "nature". The camera's mechanical objectivity is used as a means of 
creating expressions which would arouse emotional responses in the side of 
the viewer. The printed surface, as "present", functions by pointing to its 
referent as "absent." In fact, the discourses surrounding photography are 
structured upon the undecidability of term proper to the medium.
Regarding the notion of transparency attributed to the medium, what I 
would like to suggest here is that the photographic image is both transparent 
and opaque. Transparency is the outcome of thinking photography as a means 
to establish a direct link between the spectator and some visible thing
3
projecting its light on the photosensitive surface. At the same time, it is 
because of its opaqueness that it can actually show us things as they had 
once been. The oscillation between the material opaqueness and the 
transparent effect it produces makes the image-referent relationship a 
problematical issue that cannot be easily overcome. Photographic images 
render visible present the traces of those things which have already plunged 
into past. A return to the time of the photographing act is impossible. And the 
referent cannot be held stable by an assumption that it remains unchanged.
One of the leading themes of this study will be the question 
concerning the problematic of reference in photographic images. Unlike the 
preceding forms of representation, i.e. painting, which function by connecting 
the image to its referent metaphorically, photography places a metonymic 
identity between the real and its representation. Even if one gives priority to 
the photographer's intentions in setting up the scene, his genius of presenting 
the viewer a certain kind of seeing things, whether to convey an idea or to 
create emotion, the literal connection of the image to the event preceding it 
cannot be broken down so easily.
In the first chapter, an overview of critical approaches to the 
characteristics of the medium are briefly explained. The issues put forward in 
the writings of Susan Sontag and Walter Benjamin will be the guiding 
principles that shape my discussion in this chapter. Along with the invention of 
the daguerrotype, technological image production has brought changes to the
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subject's engagement with images. The advances in technology of the camera 
even accelerated these shifts. Consequently, the image is believed to be 
separated from the sphere of art or nature, and found its new place in the 
realm of technology. What has been so highly promoted in this sense is that 
the images reconstitute world's reality, and impose a false, artificial life upon 
it. Benjamin's writings on the subject matter give important clues about the 
changed status of the referent, and how this system of referentiality 
challenged traditional way of conceiving images. Sontag, also writing about 
photography, provide us with the social changes that photography brought 
about. The main concern of these thinkers on photography is to demonstrate 
the impacts of the medium in terms of the changes it brought about in 
constituting our lived environment and the subject's position in confronting 
them. The importance of such views cannot simply be left aside. However, 
giving priority to the use of the medium as a political tool is to limit its 
understanding to some confined realm - although politics is inherent in every 
facet of life.
The second chapter searches for the possible ways of a redefinition of 
photography in terms of textuality. In fact, I believe that approaching the 
medium from the point of Derridean deconstruction can open up the way for 
an understanding of the possibility of signification and communication in the 
sphere of photographic practice. Thus, my basic attempt will be to shift the
terms of argument from a discussion based on the theory of mimesis to one 
that will take its force from the "logic of the supplement" in Derridean terms.
The third chapter is specifically about Roland Barthes's book Camera 
Lucida: Reflections on Photography, which I believe can be read in the light of 
the arguments developed in the first two chapters. Not only the issues 
Barthes puts forward but the way they are brought together in the structure 
of the book is exemplary. While at a first glance, it seems as if in Camera 
Lucida, Barthes simply demonstrates a subjective approach to photographic 
images, his personal meditation does not occur in the form of photography 
criticism. It should be remembered that Barthes's engagement with 
photography is not limited to Camera Lucida. While his earlier writings 
suggest a more positivist approach employing the terms of structuralism, this 
later work resists the limitations of such analysis. However, I do not mean to 
say that Barthes simply opposes the tones of such discourses. Rather he 
moves beyond them without undermining their importance.
This study does not place in its center a certain type of photographic 
practice, such as art photography, documentary photography, journal 
photography, etc. Still, such an elimination of categories is not intended to 
suggest that there can be a generalizable philosophy of photographic images 
that is applicable to any kind whatever. In fact, what is tried to be pinned 
down are the forces that are inherent in the medium that cut through the 
confined and clearly distinguished domains and make it resistant to such strict
categorizations. My aim is not to make yet another analysis of how 
photographic images shape culture or change our conceptions of what the real 
is. Neither is it promoted that one should be engaged in personal readings of 
photographs, dismissing their roles in society. The guiding theme will be to 
look at the characteristic feature of the medium within the light of 
deconstruction and to demonstrate the various forces that are at work when 
experiencing such images. It is necessary to make a remark here, that my 
intention is not to reach some totalizing inferences and to show how one 
should "look at" photographs beyond the common norms, which would end up 
stabilizing the forces of the medium, but point to some possibilities of being
engaged in such an activity.
CHAPTER I
Photography, “Reality", Spectacle
Most discussions of visual representation technologies are basically 
concerned with the image/referent relationship. Along with the invention of 
photography and cinema, this relationship took on a far more problematic 
character with regard to the intervening of a technological apparatus in 
between the two terms. The main questions considering the photographic 
images have long been about the issues concerning its realism. With 
photographic (re)production, the image's distance from reality was believed to 
be overcome in a great sense. In most cases, photographic images are 
regarded as "unmediated transcriptions of the real." In his article “Ontology of 
the Photographic Image", André Bazin claims that the specificity of 
photography is due to neutrality of the image-making process that is free of all 
human intervention:
For the first time, between the originating object and its 
reproduction there intervenes only the instrumentality of a 
nonliving agent. For the first time, an image of the world is 
formed automatically, without the creative intervention of 
man. (Bazin quoted in Shaviro: 18)
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1.1 Bazin and Sontag: Photography as Transparent Medium
For Bazin, photographic images are traces of those things, which had 
been captured by the camera. As opposed to the other regimes of 
representation, photography’s innovation is that reality imprints itself directly 
on the film without mediation. The instrumentality of the camera, in this sense, 
brings the image and its object of depiction into close proximity, to the point 
that the spectator receives these images as if perceiving reality. A similar 
argument is put forward by Susan Sontag concerning the effect of the 
instrumentality of the camera in photographic representation:
Photography has powers that no other image-system has ever 
enjoyed because, unlike the earlier ones, it is not dependent 
on an image maker. However carefully the photographer 
intervenes in setting up and guiding the image-making 
process, the process itself remains an optical-chemical (or 
electronic) one, the workings of which are automatic. (352)
In fact these arguments on the camera’s “objectivity" emerge from 
the fact that these images are literally written by the light emanated from the 
object on the photosensitive surface, without the intervention of a creative 
hand. And this nature of the medium is brought forward when comparing it to 
other media, especially to painting. What was so insistently repeated in the 
light of these arguments was that even the most realist painting could not 
depict the world’s reality as accurately as a photograph. If the instrumentality
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of the camera establishes an unmediated link between the object and the 
subject, then it will not be wrong to claim that photography is a transparent 
medium. The effect of transparency makes the photograph a substitute for 
the object it depicts. To put it into another way, photographs mummify the 
object by capturing one of its many appearances that were once visible but 
had disappeared into the folds of time. In this case, photographic images are 
likened to a footprint, or a death mask, which circulates in the absence of its 
object.
However, neither Bazin's nor Sontag’s account simply suggest that a 
photograph is only an image reflecting the reality of some original being. What 
needs to be pointed out here is that, according to Bazin, the novel thing about 
the photograph is that the outcome is not only an image representing the 
reality of the thing, a perfect analogon of it, but at the same time it is the 
model, the object itself.
The photograph as such and the object in itself share a 
common being, after the fashion of a fingerprint. Wherefore, 
photography actually contributes something to the order of 
natural creation instead of providing a substitute for it. (Bazin 
quoted in Hebdige: 13)
In his account of the ontology of photographic images, Bazin moves 
between the “objectivity” of the camera and the “subjective” affect it 
produces. Photographs do not only reorganize perceptive field but also
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contribute to the constitution of identity and subjectivity. If such an argument 
were accepted, if photographs do not simply copy nature but themselves are a 
part of it, then one would necessarily assume that photographic perception is 
similar to natural perception. At this point Bazin’s account of photography 
embodies a paradox: photography is a product of “culture" since it is a 
technology, yet, at the same time photographs endow the spectator with 
natural perception. Belonging both to the realm of culture and nature, such 
images do not only duplicate and preserve reality, they also contribute to the 
production of it.
Following a similar line of thought, Sontag claims that photography 
does not only work on the basis of resemblance, at the same time, a 
photograph is “a part of, an extension of that subject; and a potent means of 
acquiring it, of gaining control over it" (351). Again in her account, as one gets 
earlier in the history of images, the distinction between an object and its 
image gets less sharp. Referring to the status of images in primitive societies, 
she points out how real things and images were regarded as being "two 
different, that is, physically distinct, manifestations of the same energy or 
spirit" (Sontag: 350). She criticizes the attitudes that "equate image with mere 
appearance" and that places images and reality at two extremities. 
Photographs preserve what had once taken place before the camera and they 
circulate in the society not only as substitutes, but also a part of that reality, 
independent of that originary being. And this double posture, according to 
Sontag, establishes a different relationship between image and reality, one
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that is reminiscent of the most primitive kind. The camera is passive and no 
matter how much manipulation is at work during the process, the passivity 
cannot be broken down. And it is because of this nature of the apparatus that 
it can penetrate into reality, not to represent it, but to challenge the traditional 
orders of representation.
But the true modern primitivism is not to regard the image as 
a real thing: photographic images are hardly that real.
Instead, reality has come to seem more and more like what 
we are shown by cameras... people in industrialized countries 
seek to have their pictures taken -  feel that they are images 
and are made real by photographs. (Sontag: 354 - 5)
This issue that Sontag puts forward needs to be discussed further 
since it problematizes the way technological image production has challenged 
our relationship to reality. What Sontag claims concerning this unmediated 
nature of photography is that it changes not only the notion of the image but 
also that of reality. She regards these two terms as complementary to each 
other; one cannot simply talk about the change in the nature of images by 
taking reality as a static term that resists change. For her, with the emergence 
of photography, the real has been duplicated, replaced and redefined.
Photographs can easily be produced and duplicated. When 
photographed, people, events, things, etc. become a part of a large network, 
starting from the very private (in case of family albums), all the way to the
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public (newspaper photographs), in which they can be appropriated in 
different ways. They can be carriers of information, preserve the memory of 
some person, used as proofs, etc. Whatever the context, photographs are 
seen as evidences of some past reality. The evidential force of photography 
stems from the fact that actual people, events, places, etc. had left their 
traces on the light sensitive material through a chemical process over which 
human hand had played no decisive role except for pushing the button. But as 
Sontag suggests, this way of providing an immediate access to reality is in 
fact, "another way of creating distance" (356). While bringing close in the form 
of images what would otherwise not be accessible, photographs confront us 
with the "remoteness of the real" (356). At this point, how photographs 
reproduce reality in Sontag's account gains importance. As she claims, 
photographs being documents of the past supply us with a new kind of 
experiencing the present.
While old photographs fill out our mental image of the past, 
the photographs being taken now transform what is present 
into a mental image, like the past. Cameras establish an 
inferential relation to the present (reality is known by its 
traces), provide an instantly retroactive view of experience. 
(Sontag: 358)
As opposed to the continuity and the unpredictable future of the real 
world, these frozen images of the past tell us that something had happened
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and it would not change whatever the case. Insertion of these moments of 
arrest into the flux of everyday life creates a paradoxical situation because 
what is seen in the photograph is "here", the experience of looking takes place 
at the present moment, but at the same time what one sees on the surface 
has irrecoverably disappeared. In this case, the world known through 
photographs transforms reality into an "image-world" which is resistant to 
intervention. Such is the reason why photographs disturb the viewer, leaving 
them as passive receptors (Sontag: 359). In a world where everything has 
become images of images, copies of copies, the individual's confrontation with 
the medium becomes more problematical.
An important issue that Sontag puts forward is that photographs also 
contribute to production of new meanings by "recycling" reality. Through 
photographs, the events and things become a part of a network in which they 
are assigned new uses. Her argument is that photography erases the common 
"distinctions between the beautiful and the ugly, the true and the false, the 
useful and the useless, good taste and bad," and dissolves everything into the 
realm of "the interesting" (Sontag: 363).
The photographic recycling makes clichés out of unique 
objects, distinctive and vivid artifacts out of clichés...We 
make of photography a means by which, precisely, anything 
can be said, any purpose served. (Sontag: 364)
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Whether in the realm of art or as documentation, once something is 
photographed, it becomes a part of the image-world where they can be placed 
in various contexts and appropriated in an infinite number of ways to serve 
different needs. The point Sontag puts forward here is that this capacity of 
the medium makes it vulnerable to the needs of the capitalist society, which 
operates on an image oriented culture. In fact, Sontag's concluding lines of her 
essay The Image World, mainly focuses upon the uses of photography as a 
political tool.
The arguments that Sontag brings forth, which I have summarized 
very briefly, are crucial for an understanding of the function of photographic 
images in society. However, I believe that certain problematical points in her 
line of thinking require a further debate. In her rhetoric, Sontag suggests that 
in the case of photography one cannot handle the original-copy relation by 
referring to the ideas of Plato which draws clear distinctions between the two 
terms. Basically, her claim is that the "real-world" has been replaced by an 
"image-world" and specifically the uses of photography accelerates this 
transformation. However, once the effect is formulated as the real becoming 
unreal, an illusionary presence is situated as opposed to some forgotten, lost 
reality. Even if one is talking about a transformation in reality, in which the 
traces of the past effectively re-produce the present, this "living context is 
simply a different - and seemingly more - noble ideology" (Shawcross: 44). In 
fact, this way of approaching the medium is perhaps most problematical when 
such images are used in order to exercise power over the masses. Pursuing a
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realist attitude would inevitably contribute to empowerment of what Guy 
Debord called “ the society of the spectacle".
1.2 Debord's Society of the Spectacle
According to Debord, in the society of the spectacle, the visible form 
of the commodity occupies the whole of everyday life serving to this one 
massive and complex system called the spectacle, in which production and 
consumption is brought together in a constantly self-organizing and self- 
sustaining manner. The spectacle, as put forward by Debord, is not simply the 
outcome of an agglomeration of images presented to the public by means of 
TV sets, movie theaters, advertisements, etc., it is rather a “social relation 
among people mediated by images" (12).
The spectacle cannot be understood either as a deliberate 
distortion of the visual world or as a product of the technology 
of the mass dissemination of images... It is not something 
added to the real world -  not a decorative element, so to 
speak. On the contrary, it is the very heart of society’s real 
unreality. (Debord p.12-13)
Although the images of technological production like cinema or 
photography are important figures to the society of spectacle, in Debord's 
analysis their “spectacularity” cannot be the only means to explain and 
understand the relations of forces inherent in the term spectacle. Spectacle is
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not merely an outcome of the realist attitudes towards images circulating 
through mass media, instead “the society of the spectacle is a form that 
chooses its own technical content” (Debord: 19).
If the spectacle -  understood in the limited sense of those 
"mass media" that are its most stultifying superficial 
manifestation -  seems at times to be invading society in the 
shape of a mere apparatus, it should be remembered that this 
apparatus has nothing neutral about it, and that it answers 
precisely to the needs of the spectacle’s internal dynamics. 
(Debord; 19)
Thus, it is neither the transparency of media nor their spectacular 
content that builds the spectacle. Instead, it is because such notions can 
easily be exploited in the full sense of the term to convey the spectators their 
already given imaginary positions in the society. In the spectacular society, 
under the capitalistic forms of production, people are alienated from /by the 
images they produce. They are passive observers of those images which are 
detached from lived experience and reunited under the false unity of the 
spectacle. Everyday is communicated to the passive voyeur by means of a 
look, which places vision in a highly privileged position over the other senses. 
The passivity of the observer here means his becoming a mere receptor. The 
gaze builds a gap between what is lived and what is shown. What is brought 
closer in the forms of representation in fact lies at a distance. With the 
distancing effect which is proper to the realm of images, the spectator
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becomes capable of constituting them as objects ready for consumption and 
contemplation.
The point that needs to be elaborated further at this point is the 
hegemony of the eye in the spectacular society. The spectacle’s existence is 
predominantly founded upon an understanding that establishes a direct link 
between vision and knowledge, which tries to explain all activity by the 
categories of vision. In this case, the world becomes an “object of vision” to 
be gazed at and photographs act like windows “ that frame and mediate the 
possibilities of vision" (Burnett: 4). Referring to Robert D. Romanyshyn’s 
arguments, Burnett says that the notion of the window implies a separation 
between the observing subject and the seen object. It also organizes the field 
of vision by drawing a boundary around it. Camera provides one with a 
constructed gaze. The spectator, “whose body had devolved into the eye,” is 
no more than a passive actor who fails to live his “situations" within this 
system.
What I would like to suggest at this point is that the existence of 
spectacular society is not only the outcome of technical advances in the visual 
reproduction techniques. As Debord so rightly argues by claiming that the 
spectacle chooses its visual content, it is not the merely the images, nor their 
being transparent that create the spectacle but the functions they are 
assigned in society. Approaching such images by employing the terms of 
realism becomes problematical even when we claim that reality has also been
18
transformed. Indeed while Sontag resists the attitudes of realism, by 
proposing an "unreal reality", she still affirms the existence of some real world 
not contaminated by images.
1.3 Walter Benjamin and Technical Reproducibility
In his celebrated essay Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical 
Reproduction, Benjamin not only discusses how technological reproducibility 
has changed the status of art objects but also presents these shifts as 
challenging the way one perceives and constitutes the world. According to 
Benjamin, photography and cinema do not simply represent the world, offering 
a direct and unmediated confrontation with reality, but the ease of production 
and distribution of images by technological means marks a critical turning 
point in the nature of artwork.
In Benjamin's line of inquiry the definition of the aura of an artwork 
occupies an important place. Benjamin puts forward the concept of aura as 
"the unique presence of a work of art, of a historical or of a natural object." 
And this concept is closely related to the phenomenon of distancing as again 
stated by Benjamin, "the unique phenomenon of a distance however close it 
may be" (325). The definition of aura based on the principle of distancing is 
the formulation of the cult value of the art object, rooted in ritual. With this 
definition Benjamin puts forward a fundamental and irreducible distance even
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in the closest proximity to the object. By defining aura in terms of distancing 
he reaffirms the cult value of an artwork as distant and unapproachable. With 
mechanical reproduction, he claims, the aura is lost because the technological 
apparatuses abolish this distance by bringing images and reality into a close 
proximity, both "spatially and humanly" (Benjamin 325). For example, he talks 
about how the close-up shots by the camera satisfy the desires of the masses 
by placing things nearer to the observer. Furthermore, this displacement 
brings forward the detachment of the artwork from its original context and 
"emancipates the work of art from its parasitical dependence on ritual" 
(Benjamin 326). Once an art object becomes a material for the camera and 
reproduced by mechanical means, its "authenticity" is removed from the 
criteria for its evaluation. The possibilities of technical reproduction takes 
away the uniqueness of an artwork, transforms its "cult value" derived from its 
singularity and authenticity, into "exhibition value," its capability of circulating 
easily and being exhibited.
It should be noted here that in this particular essay Benjamin talks 
about a specific use of photography, as a tool for reproducing works of art. It 
would be a mistake to take his arguments as merely criticizing photographic 
image production for what it had done to the natural status of artwork and 
applying its effects on a boarder realm of photography. As Philippe Dubois 
states in his essay Photography Mise-en-Film, the cult value of the image 
affirms itself in the photographic image more fully than any other forms of 
visual representation (167). This is due to a double posture that photographic
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images maintain in their very structure. Photograph as a material object 
stands, at the same time, closest and furthest from its object. The referent is 
lost, never to be grasped again, distant, absolutely separate, but at the same 
time it is present owing to the materiality of the medium, something that can 
be held, touched, even exchanged.
It is this hauntedness, formed by distance in proximity, 
absence in presence, the imaginary in the real, the virtuality of 
memory in the effectiveness of a trace, that draws us to 
photographs and gives them their aura: the unique 
phenomenon of a distance, however close it may be. (Dubois: 
167)
The structures of objectification and material possession by capturing 
aspects of "life itse lf in a "real" object that can be possessed, copied, 
circulated, and saved, constitute the photographic as both a "real" trace of 
personal experience and a concrete extroversion of experience that can 
"belong to someone else". These aspects give a specific form to its temporal 
existence. The photograph freezes and preserves the homogeneous and 
irreversible momentum of a temporal flow into the abstracted, atomized, and 
secured space of a moment. A moment cannot be inhabited.
The double operation triggering the effect of looking at a photograph 
is a play between the two terms presence and absence. The simultaneity of 
presence and absence, the material opacity and unmediated transparency, 
distance in proximity, endows the photographic images with a paradoxical
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structure concerning the referential system. These two terms co-exist on the 
surface of the photographic image. It is due to this double posture that there 
is always a gap, a distance, which cannot be overcome, between any object 
and its reproduction. And the presence of this gap is internal to their 
structure. In this framework one cannot simply mourn for the decay of aura, 
but one can claim a new definition of it.
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CHAPTER II
Photography and Textuality
Regarding photographs as substitutes for the things depicted has 
been a major pre-conception for the discourses established upon the subject 
matter. What the realist attitude so insistently promotes about photography is 
its unmediated character, resulting in an objective recording of world's reality. 
Such claims work on the basis of a "metaphysics of presence" that has shaped 
Western thinking.
In this chapter, I intend to go through some deconstructivist 
techniques that Derrida puts forward which, I believe, can open up the way for 
thinking on photography. This should not be understood as a one-to-one 
application of the terms of deconstruction to the realm of photography since 
such an attempt would inevitably be reductive in the sense that it would be to 
treat deconstruction as yet another system, a universal philosophy whose 
functioning can be demonstrated on various models. What deconstruction 
promotes can be seen as offering a radical way of reading that challenges any 
structurally coherent system built upon the primacy of the presence of a fixed 
originary center that ensures the stability of meaning.
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2.1 Deconstructing Metaphysics of Presence
Derridean set of deconstructionist practices are established upon the 
very existence of binary oppositions that are inherent in logocentric thinking 
and their dismantling. According to him, from a structuralist point of view 
every system has a center from which the whole system generates and its 
parts are interrelated due to the presence of such a center. Within these 
systems, Western thinking has long been based upon hierarchical binary 
oppositions such as presence/absence, culture/nature, masculine/feminine, 
original/copy, speech/writing, etc. Here, concepts like “ truth", “nature” , 
“original" are regarded as consistent, coherent in their interiority and 
wholeness. Their opposites, which might be “ falsehood” , “culture", "copy” 
relatively, are in a secondary position, without ever being capable of fulfilling 
the self-sufficiency of the first terms. In such a system of thinking, the primary 
term constitutes its identity by distinguishing itself from another identity, 
namely its opposite. Truth is truth because it is not error; original is original 
because it is not copy... This way of hierarchical ordering of terms and the 
attitude of repressing the “negative" term in any settled binary opposition that 
Western thinking has long been constituted upon, is quite problematical in the 
sense that the difference between the two terms is regarded as external to 
both of them. Several questions can be raised at this point: How can one talk 
about an integral whole, a pure idea under these conditions, if it is what it is, 
with relation to its supplement? Can it remain uncontaminated, not haunted by
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the ghost of its opposite, this outside? How is it possible to locate the 
supplement outside the whole when we cannot talk about the latter without 
the former?
One important point that we have to keep in mind is that Derrida does 
not simply oppose the existence of binary oppositions. If it were so, 
deconstruction would end up being a reversal of traditional dualisms. In order 
to deconstruct something there should be a formerly built structure whose 
method of construction is thoroughly analyzed first and then dissolved into its 
parts to open the way for new meanings to the extent that it may turn against 
itself in the end. This liberation of text (and it is not purely in linguistic terms 
that "text" is meant here) from the dominant rules of a system makes it 
transparent to infinite number of factors intervening to its meaning. The 
analyzed structure is not a mute object waiting to be read, but open to 
interferences, without the dominance of its author. At this point, I think, 
Derrida problematizes the concept of autonomy in any structured system. 
Deconstruction does not work within closed systems to dismantle, dissolve 
their fragments to break their stability but also it seems to be an 
interdisciplinary practice to question the purified and settled manner of any 
system. Although what seems to be practiced by deconstructivist discourse is 
playing with the fragments of any structure in itself, this certainly goes to the 
point that the structure's very autonomy is brought into question in the end.
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These hierarchical dualisms are indeed generated from a desire to 
secure the coherency of any signifying system by giving primacy to presence, 
which would be the originating center. The "truth" of concepts stems from their 
capabilities of being present, self-explanatory and self-sufficient.
We have experienced the systematic interdependence of the 
concepts of sense, ideality, objectivity, truth, intuition, 
perception, and expression. Their common matrix is being as 
presence: the absolute proximity of self-identity, the being-in­
front of the object available for repetition, the maintenance of 
the temporal present, whose ideal form is the self-presence of 
transcendental life, whose ideal entity allows idealiter of 
infinite repetition. (Derrida quoted in Phillips: 158)
It can now be clearer why in any metaphysics of presence the 
phonetic sign is located as the center of language. In Western metaphysics, 
presence has always been privileged over absence, which lead to the priority 
given to speech over writing since the former assumes the presence of a 
speaking subject uttering his thoughts in total simultaneity with his thoughts. 
To put it in another way, the inevitable gap between the signifier and signified 
in the language is believed to be closed, meaning to be self-contained, the 
distance between the speaker and the listener overcome, in their presence. 
Here the coherence of meaning in any utterance is fixed by means of a 
transcendental signified.
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It is not by chance that the thought of being, as the thought of 
this transcendental signified, is manifested above all in the 
voice: in a language of words. The voice is heard (understood)
-  that undoubtedly is what is called conscience -  closest to the 
self as the absolute effacement of the signifier: pure auto­
affection that necessarily has the form of time and which does 
not borrow from outside of itself, in the world or in “ reality,” 
any accessory signifier, any substance of expression foreign to 
its spontaneity. It is the unique experience of the signified 
producing itself spontaneously, from within the self, and 
nevertheless, as signified concept in the element of ideality or 
universality. (Derrida, 1976: 20)
Writing, in this context, is corrupt, deceitful since it operates in the 
absence of the author. It is a delayed act, a representation, contaminated by 
the absence of a self-presence. It is through positioning writing secondary to 
speech that thoughts about language wants to conceal the parts, namely 
distancing and difference, which are in fact integral to it. However, according 
to Derrida, it is upon these paradoxes that language constitutes itself. 
Without oppositional differences and the possibility of repeatable units 
language would not be intelligible, cannot communicate; thus speech must 
also be defined in terms of writing.
Derrida deconstructs what he calls phonocentrism by replacing the 
letter “e" with an “a" in the word difference. This small “a" is inaudible when 
the word is spoken. It is through writing that one can recognize it. Accordingly, 
what we have to do when we hear the word ‘difference’ or ‘difference’ is to
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refer to the graphic sign. By bringing up a small, “a" which cannot be heard, 
Derrida challenges the traditional logic based on phonocentrism. However, 
différence does not go on to establishing itself as a new center by giving 
priority to writing. It belongs neither to speech nor to writing. It has a 
supplementary character that cannot be “stabilized within a polarization of the 
same and the different" (Derrida, 1991: 99 ). As Derrida says:
It (différence) is at one and the same time an idea rooted in 
sameness, and radical otherness, an otherness which is 
absolutely radical. So I’d say that différence can't be enclosed 
either within the same, or the idea of radically other, about 
which nothing could be said. It’s an enigmatic relation of the 
same to the other. (1991: 99)
An important remark to be made here is that, as Derrida suggests, 
différence is not simply constitutive of identity in its present being. If it were 
so then we would need to locate it in a "simple and unmodified -  in-different -  
present” (Derrida, 1982: 11). It is by Derrida’s definition of the term that 
différence involves both a spacing in differing, and a temporization, a delay in 
deferring. These two aspects of différence, spacing and temporizing, are the 
fundamental conditions of any signification. It is a double operation to resolve 
the idea that a sign is constituted by a re-presentation of another presence, a 
substitute for it that can function in the absence of that originary presence. 
Différence as supplement generates and inhabits the terms of any binary
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opposition. It is not introduced as a third term in-between two polarized 
identities. In fact, it is due to différence that one can employ an oppositional 
absence/presence dualism. As Derrida argues "différence produces what it 
forbids, makes possible the very thing it makes impossible" (1976: 143). What 
makes signification possible is this différence. Each element has its other 
inscribed within it, a mark of pure exteriority, which Derrida calls a “ trace":
... this trace being related no less to what is called the future 
than to what is called the past, and constituting what is called 
the present by means of this very relation to what it is not: what 
it absolutely is not, not even a past or a future as a modified 
present. An interval must separate the present from what it is 
not in order for the present to be itself, but this interval that 
constitutes it as present must, by the same token, divide the 
present in and of itself, thereby also dividing, along with the 
present, everything that is thought on the basis of the present, 
that is, in our metaphysical language, every being, and singularly 
substance or the subject. In constituting itself, in dividing itself 
dynamically, this interval is what might be called spacing, the 
becoming-time of space of the becoming-space of time 
(temporization). (1982: 13)
The term “ trace" as Derrida conceptualizes here cannot be thought of 
on the basis of absence/presence dualism. It is not the present mark of some 
absent reality. Neither does it suggest that the negative term of the binary 
opposition (absence) contribute to the constitution of the positive one 
(presence.) If it were so, this would merely be to reverse the hierarchical
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order. In Derrida’s thematization of the term, trace has no site proper to it; 
dislocation, displacement and erasure belong to its structure (1982: 24).
In such a framework, any idea of a center, which controls the 
generation of a fundamentally coherent meaning, is shaken. The textual 
stability is threatened and the center is pushed to the limits. This 
inconsistency of meaning does not mean that the text lacks meaning. The 
impossibility of being full, internally coherent, is in the very structure of any 
text. According to Derrida, it is difference, distancing, rupture in writing that 
brings forth the conflicting forces inherent in the text and makes it 
communicable. Again for him, everything, including speech, in language 
operate on the model of writing and “ there is nothing outside the text."
There has never been anything but writing; there have never 
been anything but supplements, substitutive significations 
which could only come forth in a chain of differential 
references, the “ real" supervening, and being added only 
while taking on meaning from a trace and from an invocation 
of the supplement, etc. (Derrida, 1976: 159)
What Derrida is concerned with here, is not only the linguistic text. Rather, it 
refers to “ textuality” which embraces all structures such as political, historical, 
economic, real, etc. According to Richard Dienst, in Derrida, writing is a 
machine (Dienst: 131). But it does not merely record the presence of the 
spoken word for later use, to represent it in the absence of the speaker but it
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is one that constantly produces an excess by playing. The written text gives 
way to a play of interpretations, of differences between/in its elements and 
thus meaning always defers/differs. There is no longer just one meaning to be 
derived from any text, not one proper reading, not one pre-determined 
interpretation to make. Parts do not simply form a whole and serve to its 
coherency. "Despite the closure of any system, the text contains elements 
that unsettle the principle of its own production and cannot be integrated into 
it" (Frey: 125). Instead, the multiple relationships in and out of the machinic 
components, the tension between intensities, produce an excess of meaning, 
a surplus. This is not to say that the whole, the product is unimportant. But 
one cannot simply talk about one whole, closed, finished, there to be grasped.
Derrida says; "The motif of différence...plays neither the role of a 
"concept" nor simply of a "word"...différence finds itself enmeshed in the work 
that pulls it through a chain of other "concepts", other "words", other textual 
configurations". Différence, produces a multiple and complex network of 
infinite reference and opens up a space of work and of play. Once the realist 
attitude to equate signifier and signified to secure identity is overcome, 
meaning becomes subjected to production in an endless series of textual 
movements. It is this doubling operation that produces a multiplicity, a textual 
system that embraces all cultural, social and political dimensions. Once 
textuality is defined as an "illimitable matrix", one can approach certain 
problematic issues concerning visual representation in terms of différence.
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which is “ to delimit a formation of value by means of a continuous passage 
through it, out to its aporias, its limits.”
2.2 Photography and Writing
Extending these arguments into the realm of technologically produced 
images, and of photography in particular, which is the major theme of this 
study, we can point out the problems of established discourses and suggest 
another way of meditation. Logocentric thinking suggests that images are 
secondary to reality: they come after the object. In other words, if the 
existence of photographic image depend on the idea of imprint alone, the 
imprint of light emanated from the object on photosensitive surface, we are 
again faced with the orthodoxy concerning model/copy dualism. Images are 
mere representations of reality, mere copies; their existence depends solely 
on some original being.
Apart from the ones, I have just mentioned, the privileged position of 
speech in logocentric thinking has, in fact, some other correlations with the 
discourses surrounding photography. As discussed in the previous chapter, 
the unmediated transcription of the real on the film surface makes 
photographs a perfect analogon of what they show. In other words, the 
presence of one instant, that is captured and extended, can be immediately 
accessed through photographs. The self-presence of the object is conveyed to
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the viewer without mediation. In this manner, photographs are believed to 
establish a direct link between the recorded thing and the viewer owing to the 
full transparency of the medium.
The written character of photographic images are often foreclosed 
because vision is believed to be an even more direct way of making sense 
than speech. As John McCumber suggests in his essay Derrida and the 
Closure o f Vision, the metaphysics of presence is strongly related to the 
privileged position of vision in Western thinking. Vision has long been 
regarded as establishing an unmediated relation between the subject and 
reality, giving way to truthful inferences about the world. In this sense, vision 
becomes directly associated with knowledge; the gap between form and 
meaning are believed to be overcome. According to Victor Burgin, "it is this 
logocentric longing which is expressed in the ‘window-on-the-world’ realism of 
the great majority of writers on photography” (55). In fact, pursuing Derrida’s 
claim that there is nothing "beyond the text” , vision can be explained in terms 
of textuality.
An important remark to be made here is that, photographic images 
embody a paradox concerning the location of the signifier and signified. If 
images are secondary to reality, they can somehow be likened to words; 
signifiers whose signified reside elsewhere. At the same time, where the 
attitude of giving primacy to the unmediatedness would lead us is that 
photographs carry their signifieds along with themselves. With the effect of
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transparency, the photographic image becomes self-reflexive that generates 
its own meaning without necessarily making a detour to an outer reality.
2.3 Writing and Communication
Once the relation between the signifier and signified is problematized, 
the secure grounds to ensure the communication of the message of the 
photograph becomes unstable. The issues Derrida discusses in The Post Card 
might be useful to elaborate on the subject matter, especially concerning the 
delivery of any message by technological means. We should keep in mind here 
that by technology, we are not only referring to mass media technologies. In 
Derrida’s account, writing is also a technology. What the postal system 
suggests is that the possibility of non-arrival is structurally inherent in any 
message. The postcard is written for a possible addressee in the absence of 
him/her. And it circulates without the authority of the sender. The event of the 
postcard is based upon “the separation of the two correspondents from each 
other" and against the condition of their coming together (Brunette and Wills: 
180). In fact, in every system of communication, the idea of destination comes
in the first place. Message is believed to reach its destination, once it has
been sent. What Derrida suggests is that, the non-arrival is inherent in the
fo rm a tio n  o f th e  m essage , no t as som e  u n fo r tu n a te  p o s s ib ility  b u t as a
structural necessity. Thus, the proposition 'a letter may not arrive' becomes "a
le tte r can  always not arrive at its destination" (Derrida, 1991: 505).
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The mischance (the mis-address) of this chance is that in 
order to be able not to arrive, it must bear within itself a force 
and a structure, a straying of destination, such that it must 
also not arrive in any way. Even in arriving (always to some 
“subject”), the letter takes itself away from the arrival at 
arrival. It arrives elsewhere, always several times. (1991: 505)
The very formation of the message necessitates its detachability from 
an original context. Not a controllable set of concepts but an infinite and 
indefinite series of difference and deferral governs the operation of the 
communication system. Now, if a direct correspondence between the sender 
and the addressee can not be ensured by a transcendental signified that 
would ensure the stability and coherence of the meaning of the message, any 
beginning presupposing an end gets undone, yet to begin again.
Such arguments can be linked to our discussion of photography 
provided that we keep in mind the assumption that photographic images are 
generally attributed a function as carriers of messages of some sort. In 
different contexts the nature of the message can differ, for example, the 
images categorized under art-photography are most of the time believed to 
arouse a certain feeling in the spectator, which is dependent on the creator’s 
intentions. In the case of newspaper photographs, or the ones that are used 
as pieces of evidences, the aim would most commonly be to convey the viewer 
that such and such event had happened. This is not to claim that photographic
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images can be so easily fit into some categorizations and they are experienced 
accordingly. As I will try to discuss, photographs escape such strict categories 
that they were meant to function in. Being an adestined text, photographs 
cannot simply be analyzed under the determinations of the context for which 
they may have been produced. The production of meaning in photography, in 
this sense is always context oriented.
2.4 Photographic Images and the Communication of Meaning
To talk about the meaning of a photograph is to situate it within a 
discursive space where meaning is culturally produced and communicated. The 
limiting function of discourse gives way to the possibility of the production and 
exchange of meaning. In fact, the system of relations that define the 
discourse's limits are in fact not stable. In the most common understanding, 
photographic images circulating in the society are regarded as carriers of 
messages. In order to be communicated to the public, the message should be 
uttered on the basis of some generally shared codes. The discourse provides a 
context for such utterances to become communicable. In this sense, as Allan 
Sekula says, photographs are 'incomplete utterances' because their meaning 
is context oriented. The photographic message cannot be transmitted unless 
there is a pre-established system of relations governing its readability:
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We might formulate this position as follows: a photograph 
communicates by means of its association with some hidden or 
implicit text; it is this text, or system of hidden linguistic 
propositions, that carries the photograph into the domain of 
readability. (Sekula; 85)
Sekula argues that photographic images cannot be thought 
independent of the tasks they serve in community. While discussing the many 
ways of how meaning is effectively produced in photographs, he opposes to 
those critics that attribute a ‘truth value’ to the medium. According to him, if 
the photographic images were regarded as being natural, like an imprint of 
reality, this would suggest that photography has a language of its own, 
beyond the cultural determinants. This kind of an approach would fail to 
explain the production of meaning, which is always determined by discourse.
Derrida suggests in Signature Event Context that the structure of the 
sign is one that is capable of constituting itself in the absence of both the 
receiver and the sender. Nevertheless, constitution of a self, here, should 
neither be understood as being able to preserve its consistency, nor as 
remaining the same.
It is at that point that the difference as writing could no longer 
(be) an (ontological) modification of presence. In order for my 
“written communication" to retain its function as writing, i.e., 
its readability, it must remain readable despite the absolute 
disappearance of any receiver, determined in general. 
(Derrida, 1998: 7)
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According to Derrida, in order for there be communication, it must be 
“ iterable.” Repeatability of every sign that functions in communicating is a 
necessity which brings forth the fact that they “can always be detached from 
the chain in which it is inserted or given without causing it to lose all possibility 
of functioning, if not all possibility of “communicating,” precisely.” (Derrida, 
1998: 9) However, iterability does not mean to say that each repetition would 
remain the same, it rather “ introduces the possibility of irreducible difference 
(because repetition always carries difference along with it).” (Brunette and 
Wills: 87) The possibilities of communication can be revealed -still cannot be 
exhausted- by grafting the sign into various contexts. The preliminary given 
context is most of the time regarded as being the “ real” one, in which the 
writer had produced the text. But the text has a “ breaking force” that 
challenges the closure of any context. And if such a force were not an 
essential character of the sign then it would not have been able to function 
apart from its moment of creation.
These discussions on the operations of the postcard, I believe, have 
correspondences to any kind of utterance - verbal, visual, fictitious, etc. - that 
is put forward, whether addressing us intentionally or not. The photographs 
that circulate in society in enormous numbers can be rethought with the 
principles of the postal. We may not be the direct addressees of each 
photographic message, but still, we are the recipients of them. They may not 
be targeted to us as in the case of the postcard, which is stamped, addressed
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to a particular receiver, but we get to receive them in various contexts, at 
exhibitions, in family albums, newspapers, magazines, etc. Anyhow, once put 
forward they become "posts" that each of us can pick up and read as we
choose.
The direction of these arguments should not lead us to a conclusion 
that puts verbal language side by side with the visual one. As mentioned 
earlier, the relation of reference between the signifier and the signified in 
photography is different from verbal language. By explaining visuality in terms 
of textuality I do not argue that the operations taking place are same in the 
two realms. To understand how the "logic of the supplement" supplements all 
logics in Derrida's account, it is important to make a redefinition of 
photography, one that does not put the mimetic function in its center.
In the next chapter, I will propose a re-reading of Roland Barthes's 
work Camera Lucida in the light of the arguments that have been discussed 
so far. This particular work of Barthes's on photography is exemplary in the 
sense that it not only suggests an engagement with experiencing photographic 
practice in a personal level, but also for its contributions to a novel thinking on 
photography that is not limited to structural analysis. Indeed, at various points 
Barthes's narrative echoes the terms of Derridean deconstruction. While, at a 
first glance. Camera Lucida provides us nothing but a personal work of 
mourning - mourning of Barthes after his mother's death - that places certain
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photographic images at its center, it is precisely because of that reason it 
becomes a powerful narrative.
40
CHAPTER III
Barthes and Camera Lucida
In Camera Lucida: Reflections on Photography, Roland Barthes puts 
forward several important issues about photographs, which I believe are 
crucial to the experience of photographic images. Without forgetting his 
earlier texts about the subject matter and that the book is written as an 
homage to Sartre, I believe that it could be read on the basis of the terms it 
creates apart from all the literature that preceded it or affected its writing.
First of all, we should point out that in Camera Lucida, Barthes is not 
writing about photography in general, but about his experience of looking at 
particular photographs. Barthes’s approach to photographs throughout 
Camera Lucida pursues this highly personal tone. While presenting the reader 
with certain photographs and reflecting on them, his aim is not to clarify the 
truth in them, nor to reach a meaning, but to stress in what manner certain 
pictures have an effect on him: “ I dismiss all knowledge, all culture, I refuse to 
inherit anything from another eye than my own” (1991b: 51). But such an 
approach should not simply be taken as a subjective attitude that aims no 
more than writing about his feelings, thoughts, about some of the photographs 
he chooses whether arbitrarily or deliberately and excluding all scientific
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attitude whatsoever. In fact the urge that made him reflect upon photography 
is originated from an “ontological desire", to discover its essential feature that 
marked its difference from other types of images. (Barthes, 1991b: 3) At the 
very beginning of his adventurous search to find out what photography is “ in 
itself” , Barthes locates his self as “a subject torn between two languages, one 
expressive, the other critical" (1991b: p.8). He resists the reductive tone of 
the discourses of sociology, semiology, psychology, etc. which cannot fully 
satisfy his desire for writing about his engagement with photographs. Rather 
than contributing to the social, in preserving his personal tone, what he 
suggests is a singular science for each object, a mathesis singulahs, a science 
of absolute contingency, which will create each time the new. By making 
himself a mediator for photography, he tries to find out “ the fundamental 
feature, the universal without which there would be no photography." (p.9) 
The beginning of his quest for the noeme of photography (its guiding 
principle), is marked by a self split between "a naïve T who does not yet know 
where the journey will lead and a more knowledgeable, sophisticated Î  who 
has completed it" (Shapiro 6). The tension between the "two voices" that 
shapes Barthes's narrative is not to be resolved in the course of the book by 
choosing one at the expense of the other. In fact, it seems to be the force that 
gives rhythm to the overall narrative.
The division of the self does not stop at this point. A fter asking the 
question “What does my body know of Photography?" Barthes states that the 
subject can be engaged in the photographic act under three positions: subject
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being photographed, photographer, and spectator. From this point on, Barthes 
says that he will leave aside the second position, since he had not practiced 
photography as such. His narrative is structured upon the issues concerning 
the other two, the subject of photograph as the referent and the viewer, and 
especially the relation in between the two positions.
An important theme central to Barthes’s mediation on photographs in 
Camera Lucida is death. The relation of death with the photographic image 
occurs at different levels. According to Barthes, any discussion on 
photography should start with the conception of death, since "each reading of 
a photo is implicitly, in a repressed manner, a contract with what has ceased 
to exist, a contract with death" (Barthes quoted in Burnett: 33). The relation to 
death is first of all the outcome of the fact that photographs are truthful 
witnesses of something, but the thing they witness no longer exists as such.
3.1 Subject as the Target of Photography
Every photograph is an annunciation of the death of the subject 
photographed. The word "subject" here, designates not only a living person, 
but also things, events, scenes, in short, anything that is a material for the 
camera. With the click of the shutter, the subject posing in front of the lens is 
transformed into an object. Barthes mentions this when he speaks of the 
uneasiness he feels while posing in front of the camera. In the earlier years of
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photography, due to technical necessities, the duration of posing was far 
greater compared to the instantaneity of today’s cameras. The person who 
was going to have his picture taken needed to stay motionless before the lens 
for several minutes. However long (or short) the time of exposure is, by 
making himself a material for the photographic lens, he lets himself be 
transformed into an image. Posing, according to Barthes, causes this 
transformation to take place even before the photograph is taken.
In front of the lens, I am at the same time: the one I think I 
am, the one I want others to think I am, the one photographer 
thinks I am, and the one he makes use of to exhibit his art. In 
other words, a strange action: I do not stop imitating myself... 
the Photograph (the one I intend) represents that very subtle 
moment when, to tell the truth, I am neither subject nor object 
but a subject who feels he is becoming an object: I then 
experience a micro-version of death...: I am truly becoming a 
specter. (1991b: 14)
Being the object of camera one experiences this transformation of becoming 
"Total-Image, which is to say. Death in person" (Barthes 1991b: 14). 
Considering the difference in the length of exposure time, Benjamin makes a 
suggestion that in the earlier days of photography, the procedure that 
necessitated the subject to stand still for a long time in front of the camera 
"caused the subject to focus his life in the moment rather than hurrying past 
on it" (1979: 245). Benjamin claims that the aura of the photographs belonging 
to this earlier period is generated from this procedure which caused the
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subject to grow into the picture, taking the imprint of his duration as well. The 
advents in the technology of photographic apparatus decreased the long 
interval of exposure to an instant and consequently, caused photographic 
images to be understood in terms of mimesis. For Benjamin, the sophistication 
of camera ironically marks the decline of photography, since it conceals the 
"becoming-image" of the thing in its momentary recording.
3.2 Studium and Punctum
Writing on his experiences of looking at photographs, Barthes 
mentions the co-existence of two heterogeneous components of the image. 
These two elements function on entirely different levels but in correspondence 
to each other. To designate the first element that is found almost in all 
photographs, Barthes chooses the Latin word studium, which means 
"application to a thing, taste for someone, a kind of general, enthusiastic 
commitment" (1991b: 26). According to Barthes, studium comes into play 
when one is engaged in a direct reading of a photograph within the terms of 
signification. Studium, establishing a coded relation between the image and its 
referent, places the “photographic meaning" in a world of comprehensible 
objects. Belonging to the realm of shared language, culture, history and so 
forth, studium speaks to the viewer in a conventionalized context. It is what 
makes the photograph communicate with a general audience.
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To recognize the studium is inevitably to encounter the 
photographer’s intentions, to enter into harmony with them, to 
approve or disapprove of them, but always to understand 
them, to argue them within myself, for culture (from which 
studium  derives) is a contract arrived at between creators and 
consumers. (Barthes, 1991b: 27-28)
Several functions attributed to photographs such as to inform, to surprise, to 
shock, etc. belong to the level of studium. The spectator recognizes these 
effects through his knowledge and/or past experiences. Studium arouses a 
general interest in the spectator, which is determined by the cultural, social 
context.
The second element, for which Barthes uses another Latin word 
punctum, meaning, “a mark made by a pointed instrument” , is that which 
“breaks the studium” , punctures the signifying surface. Emerging right from 
the scene and capturing the eye of the spectator, punctum creates a wound. 
As Barthes puts it, the punctum is “ this element which rises from the scene, 
shoots out of it like an arrow, and pierces me” (1991 b: 26).
As put forward in the earlier part of Camera Lucida', most of the 
time, punctum is inherent in a small but revealing detail in the photograph, 
which happened to be there accidentally. Whether this small detail exists in 
the scene dependent on or independent of the photographer's intentions is
' In the second part of the book, Barthes introduces a somehow different conceptualization of 
punctum, which I will be discussing later.
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According to Barthes, the mere presence of this element arouses an 
interest in the spectator for that particular photograph. Unlike the studium, it 
is not discovered by the spectator through an analysis, it is rather received as 
if springing out from the very surface of the photograph and arresting the eye 
of the beholder. After having recognized it, the value of the photograph 
changes in his eyes, as if a new image emerges from the surface of the 
printed material and distinguishes it from other images. Insofar as it is not 
punctured by the punctum, studium evokes a general interest in the spectator. 
No disturbance, no wound, no love but a certain shock, surprise or an 
agreement. As opposed to the studium’s generalized stance, punctum is an 
intensely private element, functioning at a highly personal, subjective level. 
Moreover, its position cannot be fixed. Depending on the time of looking and 
also with respect to the viewer, the punctum shifts. The particular 
photographs from which Barthes recognizes the effect of punctum in Camera 
Lucida are not necessarily the same ones that would prick the reader, or any 
other spectator who could have encountered them in a different context than 
the one of the book. Punctum, being the undeterminable, uncontrollable 
element, emerges from an encounter between a photograph and the 
spectator's consciousness. Thus, the effect of the punctum in a particular 
picture is of a contingent nature, cannot be generalized and attributed to a 
universal subject.
irrelevant, because intended or not it belongs to the photographic text and in
order for it to function, "the punctum must be mine" (Shapiro: 20).
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Despite the fact that a photograph can be reproduced many times, 
and can circulate in the society through various medium (printed in magazines, 
newspapers, exhibited in galleries, or merely being collected in photo albums, 
etc.), the punctum, creating a crack in the surface of reproduction, 
singularizes the photographic image.
As Derrida puts forward in his article The Deaths of Roland Barthes, 
there is a two-way movement in the operation of the punctum. While it arises 
from the photograph, pointing to the viewer, addressing him, its direction is 
reversed on the side of the viewer. At the same instance of its pointing to me, 
I point to it.
It is thus that the punctuated photograph points me. Even on 
its minute surface, the same point divides itself: this double 
punctuation disorganizes from the start both the unary and the 
desire that finds its order there. (Derrida, 1988b: 265)
The singularity of the punctum cannot be thought independent of the 
generality of the studium since the experience of this contingent element is 
not possible if there were no already coded meaning at work. The difficulty 
here is to understand how the two terms are related to one another. 
Concerning the co-presence of studium and punctum, what Derrida suggests 
is that, although these two can easily be seen as opposable terms, in Barthes 
they are brought into play, “the one for the other, in a metonymic 
composition" (1988b: 262). The relation between the uncoded element and
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the always already coded one cannot be regarded as exclusive or 
contradictory, rather it is compositional. One cannot simply isolate one term 
from the other or treat them as two opposable concepts constituting an 
identity. In Derrida’s words, the punctum belongs to the studium without 
belonging to it; composes with it while preserving its heterogeneity; cannot be 
located in it but rather haunts it. (1988b: 267) Punctum “scans” the studium, 
but being its absolute other, cannot be located in it, neither simply stands 
outside it. The complete otherness of the punctum gives rhythm to the 
studium. Furthermore, Derrida says that:
...the punctum is not what it is. This absolute other composes 
with the same, with its absolute other which is thus not its 
opposite, with the locus of the same and of the studium (it is 
the limit of the binary opposition and, undoubtably, of any 
structural analysis the studium itself can exploit). (1988b: 285)
The disseminative force of the punctum is derived from its 
supplementary character. Again it should be pointed out that the punctum as 
supplement should not be understood as the dialectical opposite of the 
studium, which would mean to say that it is secondary, in relation to the 
primary coded meaning. According to Barthes, whether it is put deliberately or 
has happened to be there out of coincidence, the punctum "is an addition: it is 
what I add to the photograph and what is nonetheless already there" (1991b: 
55). Although remaining a detail, the punctum has a metonymic power of
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expansion: "it fills the whole picture" (1991b: 45). The difficulty here is that 
one cannot easily find a location proper to the punctum. At a first glance, the 
punctunn seems to reside within the photographic image and at the same time, 
as Barthes suggests, it creates a "blind field", thus marking the space outside 
the frame. One may be tempted to claim here that punctum, springing out 
from the inside of the framed space, moves towards outside the frame, to 
what is not shown within that confined space of the photographic print. This 
way of thinking the punctum, as a visibly present element signifying 
absence, would inevitably lead us to an affirmation of a border and thus, a 
confirmation of the presence of two identifiable “places", i.e. inside and 
outside. However, if the punctum belongs to the inside of the frame without 
belonging to it, and marks the belonging and inclusion in the same movement, 
it cannot be thought of as simply located inside or outside the photograph. 
The play of punctum, in this sense, marks an abyssal relationship in the heart 
of the photographic image.
an
As soon as we can no longer distinguish between two places, 
contents and things, the punctum  is not entirely subjugated to 
a concept, if by this one means a predicative, distinct, and 
opposable determination. This concept of a ghost is as 
scarcely perceptible in itself as the ghost of a concept. 
Neither life nor death, it is the haunting of one by the 
other...Ghosts: the concept of the other in the same, the 
punctum  in the studium, the dead other alive in me. This 
concept of the photograph photographs all conceptual
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oppositions, it traces a relationship of haunting which perhaps 
is constitutive of all logics. (Derrida 1988b: 267)
According to this logic of the supplement, the term trace that Derrida uses 
cannot be understood as a substitute to the presence of an object that marks 
its absence. Photograph, which is likened to a death mask by Sontag, can be 
understood in terms of a trace, "a form which indicates the failure of presence, 
a face which withdraws behind the form which presents it" (Critchley: 108). 
Trace, being something more than a simple duplication of the object, points to 
the space between the object and its image, where there can be no fixed 
origin that would ensure mimesis, but pure resemblance which can resemble 
nothing.
Traces do not return to the moment of the mark, they are 
without origin, but not without end in the permanence that 
seems to perpetuate them, traces which, even while 
becoming confounded and replacing themselves, are forever 
there and forever cut off from that whose trace they would 
be, having no other being than their plurality, as if there were 
not a trace but traces never the same and always repeated. 
(Derrida quoted in Taylor: 24)
A characteristic feature of the punctum is that the difficulty of its 
thematization which requires the introduction of verbal language into the 
visual realm. Barthes's another essay The Third Meaning might be helpful for
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understanding the punctum's relation to language. The theme of this latter 
essay is different from Camera Lucida·, here Barthes looks into the "obtuse 
meaning" in film stills, and in particular in Eisentein stills. The differences 
between photographic image and film still -photogramme - are put forward 
several times in both writings. The operation of what Barthes calls the "obtuse 
meaning" cannot be directly associated with those of punctum, considering the 
different forces at work in the two media. However, one can draw some 
similarities in the conceptualizations of the two terms, especially in terms of 
the "logic of the supplement" and the way they cause a rupture in the 
signification system.
If the obtuse meaning cannot be described, that is because, in 
contrast to the obvious meaning, it does not copy anything - 
how do you describe something that does not represent 
anything? The pictorial "rendering" of words is here 
impossible, with the consequence that if, in front of these 
images, we remain, you and I, at the level of articulated 
language. (Barthes, 1991a: 326)
Similarly, punctum, being the uncoded element, and not a function of 
language, is not to be conveyed in words, but is to be experienced. "What I 
can name cannot really prick me. The incapacity to name is a good symptom 
of disturbance” (Barthes, 1991b: 51). It is because of the nature of the 
punctum that although one can understand its certain characteristics or how it 
functions, it is not possible to provide a specific account of what the term is.
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To put it in another way, although Barthes can establish a theoretical 
framework to show how in some photographs the punctum captures his eye 
and arouses a feeling of great interest in him, it is inevitable that the examples 
he provides would not function in the same manner for a reader of Camera 
Lucida. Thus it would be a mistake to reduce the effect of punctum to 
Barthes’s own commentaries and try to get the same feeling out of these 
pictures, which will only be an aftereffect, that is, a product of language. Even 
Barthes himself falls prey to the difficulty of the task he undertakes, when 
trying to clarify what the punctum is, under certain examples. Let us consider 
the black family photograph. While demonstrating how the punctum can reveal 
itself when one is no longer looking at the photograph, Barthes supports his 
argument with a commentary upon the new punctum, i.e. the gold necklace:
...later on I realized that the real punctum was the necklace 
she was wearing; for (no doubt) it was this same necklace (a 
slender ribbon of braided gold) which I had seen worn by 
someone in my own family, and which, once she died, 
remained shut up in a family box of old jewelry (this sister of 
my father never married, lived with her mother as an old maid, 
and I had always been saddened whenever I thought of her 
dreary life). (1991b: 53)
In the passage quoted above even though Barthes does not undertake 
a mission that would provide an interpretation that can be communicated with 
a general audience, he still cannot avoid building up a narrative around the 
punctum. This is not to say that we can share his feelings aroused by the force
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of this particular detail, which are strictly personal. But his attempt to clarify 
the effect it has on him reduces its force as the punctum, the unnameable and 
incommunicable element of the image. Such an illustration inevitably places 
the punctum into a system of codes. In fact, to some degree, all the 
photographs Barthes reproduces in Camera Lucida in order to present the 
reader with how punctum effects him run this risk. In fact, those photographs 
can only function in the structure of the book to communicate with the reader 
on the level of studium. And this is precisely what Barthes is not interested in.
So, why is Barthes so insistent upon giving us examples of the play of 
punctum in certain images while he is aware of the fact that the thing he is 
striving to communicate with the reader is necessarily incommunicable? It is 
perhaps because he needs to validate the existence of such an experience, 
which can only be possible by providing a narrative for it, thus making it known 
to the reader and even to himself. This is not to claim that his task is by nature 
impossible, so should not be undertaken. As Derek Attridge suggests in his 
essay Roland Barthes's Obtuse. Sharp Meaning, this attempt to exemplify 
goes parallel with Derrida’s discussion on the demand for translation:
The details that bruise or pierce him call out to be made 
known, to be transferred from the singular to the general, 
from the idiosyncratic to the communal. Indeed, it might be 
said that they are fully constituted in their incomprehensibility 
in the necessary attempt to render them comprehensible, that 
their specificity actually depends on the words (or other
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codings) by which the viewer acknowledges and attempts to 
articulate them -  in the first place, to his or herself. Thus they 
appear only in the moment of disappearance. (Attridge: 84)
Following Attridge, we can say that Barthes's betrayal of the effect of 
the punctum is necessarily inherent to its very nature. In order to prevent the 
punctum from “sinking into nothingness” , he needs to bring it back "to the 
flesh of the world", by giving it a body and inevitably make it a product of 
language, at least to some degree. But as I have mentioned above, once it is 
named, the punctum cannot preserve its power as the obscure element. The 
moment when it appears by disappearing is fatal, like the instant when the 
shutter was clicked.
Talking about a photograph of a black family taken by James Van der 
Zee, Barthes draws our attention to the belt worn by one of the figures 
(possibly a sister or daughter) as the detail that aroused a great interest in 
him. A fter several pages, another detail in the same photograph is said to be 
the real punctum, the necklace worn by the black woman. He realizes this 
when he is thinking about that picture which is no longer in front of him.
Ultimately -  or at the limit -  in order to see a photograph well, 
it is best to look away or close your eyes. The necessary 
condition for an image is sight,’ Janouch told Kafka; and 
Kafka smiled and replied: ‘We photograph things in order to 
drive them out of our minds. My stories are a way of shutting 
my eyes.' (Barthes, 1991b: 53)
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In Barthes's understanding, the experience of photographic images do 
not only occur in terms of their visible aspects, of what they insistently reveal 
to the eye of the spectator. Rather, it happens at a level in which one moves 
between visibility and invisibility, thus "suspends the gesture which conflates 
photography with pure hallucination" (Durand: 145).
3.3 Problematic of the Referent
One of the issues that are discussed at length in Camera Lucida is the 
question concerning the referent in photographic images. By nature, 
photography reproduces almost infinitely, what had taken place for once and 
what can never be repeated. In the photographic image the subject’s flow, 
duration is torn from a continuum and suspended forever. Photography makes 
its object disappear and return within an instant. The photographic referent 
does not relate to some outer reality, but can only refer to itself. It is 
inseparable from the photograph.
I call “photographic referent” not the optionally real thing to 
which an image or a sign refers but the necessarily real thing 
which has been placed before the lens, without which there 
would be no photograph... in Photography I can never deny 
that the thing has been there. (Barthes, p.76)
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This makes every image an absolute particular, for which, each time 
signifier and the signified merges into one another in the surface of the print. It 
is necessary to note here that, in the systems of representation, the process of 
reference functions by providing a framework for a signifier to be related to a 
signified that is located elsewhere. Whereas in photography, the referential 
system folds back upon itself, due to the fact that the moment when the 
shutter is released can never be repeated existentially. The photographic 
image persistently renders visible the absolute singularity of the other which 
has already disappeared in the folds of time. In Barthes terms, “ It is as if the 
photograph always carries its referent with itself" (1991b: 5). Here, Derrida's 
suggestions on the question of how referential system works in photography 
gains importance:
But should we say the 'reference' or 'the referent'? Analytic 
precision must here be equal to the stakes, and the 
photograph puts this precision to the test: in the photograph, 
the referent is noticeably absent, suspendable, vanished into 
the unique past time of its event, but reference to this 
referent, let us say the intentional movement of reference,... 
also implies irreducibly the having-been of a unique and 
invariable referent. It implies the 'return of the dead' in the 
very structure of both its image and the phenomenon of its 
image. (Derrida 1988b: 281)
After discussing the photograph's relation to its referent, and pointing out how
this relation in photography differs from the other forms of representation, like
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cinema or painting, Barthes concludes that the photograph's noeme, its 
inimitable feature is "that-has-been", ga-6t6 (1991b: 79). What each 
photograph points to, is this past presence, although it does not necessarily 
say what no longer is. Pursuing Derrida's comments on the problem of 
reference we can add that even when a photograph is faked by the making of 
certain manipulations during the process, still an argument that takes 
reference as the founding order of photography, referring to this unique 
referent would be relevant.
3.4 Photographic Time and Death's Upsurge
Even in this most instantaneous forms photography is a delayed 
action not simply because the time lag on the side of the viewer but for the 
fact that it claims to capture the presence which is already absent. This double 
operation is in the very structure of photographic images. They are closest to 
reality because the object’s luminous imprint sticks quite literally to its skin (to 
the negative, or on the paper as in the case of Polaroid); and at the same time 
they are furthest since the object stands forever distant, separate both 
temporally and spatially. When looking at a photograph “we pass continually 
from the object’s here-and-now to its elsewhere-in-the-past” (Dubois: 167). It 
is on the basis of this play in between the terms from which the experience of 
photographs flourishes.
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In the second part of Camera Lucida, one of the central issues that 
Barthes puts forward is the photograph's relation to time. Looking at a picture 
of Lewis Payne waiting for his execution in a prison cell, Barthes read at one 
and the same time both "this w ill be and this has been"; the young boy as 
already dead and as going to die. At this point, a new punctum emerges from 
the relation of the photograph with Time. Here, the punctum is longer inherent 
in the detail, rather it marks the unique relation of the photographic image to 
its referent. The photographic image causes a disruption in the flow of linear 
time. While bringing forward what had once taken place, according to 
Barthes, it tells of "death in future." Although they are most commonly 
regarded as being attached to life, Barthes says that "each photograph always 
contains this imperious sign of my future death" (1991b: 97). In the 
photographic image death and the referent share the same space. The living 
images of dead people in the photograph resist any relation to life.
And it is the modern possibility of the photograph (whether it 
be an art or a technique matters little here) which combines 
death and the referent in the same system. (Derrida, 1988b:
281)
Death cannot be experienced by the subject because one cannot live 
one's death as such. When it is lived, it is always the death of an other. By the 
same token, it can never occupy the present tense. It is either past, but not 
passed enough, or to come, but that which does not arrive. Death disrupts the
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continuity of time that links past to future. Photographs remind us of our own 
mortality before death has taken place. While announcing the death of the 
photographed subject, it points to the possibility of our own death. In the 
photograph, we are shown what will remain of us when we are no longer there 
in self-presence but this is not to say that the photograph tells us our future 
death, instead it affirms that “we will only be here the way we have always 
been here, as images" (Cadava p.224). Here, when we speak of death, it is 
not the opposite of Life as such, but in Barthes words, it is "my own 
undialectical death."
Photography is characterized by its being tied to the past; it provides 
us with a retrospective kind of experience. Concerning the effect of 
transparency of the medium, Barthes says that in photography the light 
reflected from the subject reaches the eye of the spectator. In this sense, 
photographs become a certificate of presence. “That-has-been” is what every 
photograph tells the spectator. Looking at a picture of someone we know, we 
tend reconstruct this person, as he/she was when the picture was taken. The 
way the photographed body looks at us has no references to our present life. 
In order to understand the meaning of the image, one traces the way back, 
from the present backwards. The photographic image has a presence, which 
causes a disruption in the linearity of past, present and future. The 
photographic image reveals that something had been present, in its materiality 
and at the same time this “presence" of the referent escapes, since it has
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already passed. The referent’s presence, lingering on the materiality of the 
print, points to its death.
Vivian Sobchack discusses the temporal dimension of photographs as 
a “vacancy" in the heart of the “possibility of temporality” (59). The act of 
looking at the material imprint of something that had been in the past, takes 
place in the present time of the spectator but it “ transcends both our 
immediate present and our lived experience of temporality because it exists 
for us as never engaged in the activity of becoming" (Sobchack: 59). Then 
again, the possibility of becoming is inherent in the stillness of the photograph 
but is never presented as such. Thus, Sobchack claims that photographs 
introduce their atemporality “within the existence and finitude.” The 
atemporality of photographic images cannot be thought of a transcendental 
time. It resides in finitude by never quite belonging or being a part of it.
...what I see has been here, in this place which extends 
between infinity and the subject (operator or spectator): it has 
been here, and yet immediately separated: it has been 
absolutely, irrefutably present, and yet already deferred...In 
Photography, the presence of the thing (at a certain past 
moment) is never metaphoric: ... if the photograph then 
becomes horrible, it is because it certifies, so to speak, that 
the corpse is alive, as corpse: it is the living image of a dead 
thing. (Barthes, 1991b: 77-78)
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3.5 W inter Garden Photograph
Looking through some photographs after his mother's death, Barthes 
says that none of them revealed her being in a complete manner. He claims 
that these photographs just provided him with some fragments, which could 
not help him recognize her in her totality, therefore he "missed her altogether" 
(Barthes, 1991 b: 66). None but one photograph achieves to capture the “ truth 
of the face (he) loved” , namely the Winter Garden photograph which was 
taken when his mother was five years old. This particular photograph makes 
Barthes rediscover his mother as if she was born again in the image. He sees 
his mother in this photograph although he had never seen her as in the 
photograph. And the “truth" in the photograph he talks about is not a 
transcendental or general phenomenon; as he insistently repeats that it is a 
truth peculiar to him. According to Barthes, the “ truth" that is revealed in this 
image is his mother's innocence and kindness, “which had formed her being 
immediately and forever" and that which “belonged to no system" (1991b: 
69). The photograph wounds him, pointing to an absence, which can never be 
filled while the image “ fills the sight by force.”
The force of the Winter Garden photograph does not reside in the 
photographer's preconceived notion of what makes a good picture, nor in the 
camera's ability to capture the subject's appearance with great accuracy. The 
photographer here is a mediator of the past which had never been present to
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Barthes. Once the image wounds the heart of the spectator, questions like "Is 
it really Barthes's mother in the photograph or some other little girl who 
looked like her?", "What is the purpose of this picture?", etc. become obsolete. 
From that moment on, no culture can translate this suffering he feels in front 
of the photograph of the loved body which is not the product of any schema.
The Winter Garden is the only photograph that is not published in the 
book. Barthes says that it wounds him but for the reader of the book it would 
be just another picture, an indifferent, ordinary one: "it cannot in any way 
constitute the visible object of a science; it cannot establish an objectivity, in 
the positive sense of the term; at most it would interest your Studium: period, 
clothes, photogeny; but in it, for you, no wound” (1991b: 73). This childhood 
photograph of Barthes's mother remains invisible but surrounded by the light 
that the text sheds upon it. Hence, in Derrida's words it becomes "the invisible 
punctum" of the whole narrative.
The mark of this unique wound is nowhere visible as such, but 
its unbeatable clarity (that of his mother's eyes) irradiates the 
whole study. It makes of this book an irreplaceable event. And 
yet only a metonymic force can still assure a certain generality 
to the discourse and offer it to analysis by submitting its 
concepts to a quasi-instrumental employment. (Derrida, 
1988b: 286)
According to Derrida, the disseminative force of the punctum, its metonymic 
power makes us capable of speaking of the work. Composing with the Same
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yet remaining Different, it lets us speak of the impossible while still retaining it 
as impossibility. Instead of making his suffering subjected to any kind of 
analysis, which would nevertheless be to reduce the pain, Barthes keeps it as 
the driving force of his work. Thus he speaks of the photograph without 
showing it, but not hiding it at the same time, because the narrative he builds 
upon it can again reveal it to us, while maintaining its invisibility.
Looking at a photograph of a loved person is in fact one of the most 
personal ways of being engaged in photographic experience on the side of the 
viewer. The evidential force of photography, in this case, exceeds its "power of 
representation" (Barthes, 1991b: 89). The Winter Garden photograph, which 
Barthes claims to have "achieved the impossible science of unique being" for 
him, points to his mother's death not only because he knows that she is dead, 
but because it reveals so perfectly her "being" which could only appear in the 
time of death. This life-giving picture testifies to the irreversibility of her death. 
The photograph here, being the unmediated medium that preserves the 
emanation of the referent, becomes the mediator for his work of mourning. But 
how can a photograph, a living mark of some past being can be so powerful? In 
his article By Force of Mourning, Derrida claims that the force of the image 
resides in its capacity of "making appear the one who had disappeared, of 
making them re-appear with greater clarity" (1996: 185). Thus as Beryl 
Schlossman rightly argues:
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According to Barthes, History is ''hysterical"; it can be the 
object of our gaze only if it excludes us ... The subject who 
turns on lights to look at them cannot enter their worlds, nor 
can History or Photography move over the threshold that 
separates the dead from the living, Eurydice from the world of 
Orpheus. (Schlossman: 155)
What remains when the identity is cracked in the upsurge of death is the 
power of punctum that singularizes the image in the spectator, and reveals the 
forces that will create the future. If photography is as stated by Barthes 
"without future", it is because the future is left to be created, it is not pre-given 
or foreseen. The double death in photography, "death triumphant and defeated 
at the same time", gives one the power to project into the future by opening 
onto a void for unforeseenable relations.
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CONCLUSION
In Maurice Blanchot's writings, the term "image" occupies a crucial 
place. Keeping in mind that in Blanchot's writings, "image" does not 
specifically refer to those of technological production, but to literature, I would 
not make the photographic image a model for an understanding of his 
conceptualization of the term. Still, I believe that the way he conceptualizes 
the term “ image” in the realm of literature can give us certain insights 
regarding photographic images.
In his account of the image, Blanchot begins with the claim that 
“seeing presupposes distance". In natural perception, the object of my gaze is 
separated from me. As Steven Shaviro suggests such a separation is the 
affirmation of the border between subject and object, viewer and the thing- 
seen, which gives one the power to constitute oneself as an active subject. 
The objects of vision in this sense are under the control of the spectator, 
ready at his disposal (Shaviro: 47). The distinction Blanchot makes between 
this way of thinking about vision and the regime of the image is crucial. 
Blanchot resists the idea that the image comes after the object, and is thus 
subordinated to it.
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Here the distance is in the heart of the thing. The thing was 
there; we grasped it in the vital movement of a comprehension 
action -  and lo, having become image, instantly it has become 
that which no one can grasp, the unreal, the impossible. It is 
not the same thing at a distance but the thing as distance, 
present in its absence, graspable because ungraspable, 
appearing as disappeared. It is the return of what does not 
come back, the strange heart of remoteness as the life and 
the sole heart of the thing. (Blanchot: 255-256)
The release of the image takes place when seeing becomes a "contact 
at a distance." In the moment of fascination, one can no longer put a proper 
distance between himself and the thing-seen, is not able to constitute it as an 
object and thus, he is stripped of his power to give sense. The thing, becoming 
its image, touches the eye, but the eye cannot grasp it. One cannot talk about 
an active or a receptive subject in the milieu of fascination. The impossibility of 
mastery over the thing by means of a look marks the passive regime of the 
image.
In it blindness is vision still, vision which is no longer the 
possibility of seeing, but the impossibility of not seeing, the 
impossibility which becomes visible and perseveres -  always 
and always -  in a vision that never comes to an end; a dead 
gaze, a gaze become the ghost of an eternal vision." 
(Blanchot: 32)
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To the one who is fascinated, the thing no longer reveals itself as a 
real object belonging to the flesh of the world, but affirms itself in an 
atemporal presence, belonging to the “ indeterminate milieu of fascination" 
(Blanchot: 32). Distance cannot be overcome by the active intentionality of 
the subject, but becomes unmeasurable because what touches in an 
"immediate proximity" leaves one infinitely separated.
In "The Two Versions of the Imaginary", Blanchot suggests that the 
image has a double character and points to the paradoxical relation between 
visibility and invisibility. In the first place, having emerged from a gaze cast 
upon the object, the image can show the thing "ideally" and thus, can be “ the 
life-giving negation of the thing.” And at the same time, the image inserts 
itself into the thing, not as a substitute, which takes the place of the object's 
prior reality and affirms its presence, but as its “neutral double" (Blanchot: 
262). This duplicity lies at the heart of the image, and by pointing to the 
absolute Otherness inscribed in the same, death in life, it gives the image its 
spectrality. What the image reveals is not an object with an assignable origin 
but the originary splitting, which belong to no system of signification. With the 
origin always -  already split, it becomes impossible to tell the real from its 
double, since the real has become its own double.
The dead present is the impossibility of making any presence 
real -  an impossibility which is present, which is there as the 
present’s double, the shadow of the present which the present 
bears and hides in itself. (Blanchot: 31)
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What can be derived from Blanchot’s claims concerning death is that it 
belongs to the realm of insignificance, infinity, and indifference that intervenes 
in every facet of life by being present in its absence.
Blanchot's account on the cadaver is exemplary for an understanding 
of image's relation to death. The cadaver cuts across the dialectical subject- 
object relation, since it is neither the one nor the other but a non-dialectical 
other to both terms. In Blanchot’s account, the image has a “cadaverous 
presence.” What we are faced to face with is neither the living reality nor 
another reality that stands apart from it. This material residue refuses to 
disappear. It occupies space as a “non-thing."
Death suspends the relation to place, even though the 
deceased rests heavily in his spot as if upon the basis that is 
left him. To be precise, this basis lacks, the place is missing, 
the corpse is not in its place...The deceased, it is said, is no 
longer of this world; he has left it behind. But behind there is, 
precisely, this cadaver, which is not of the world either, even 
though it is here. (Blanchot: 256-257)
What remains from the dead person’s body cannot find its proper place. The 
cadaver's presence has no topos, but its very presence of absence, the 
undecidability of its location “establishes a relation between here and 
nowhere” . Between the object and the image there is a threshold that marks 
the abyss.
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In Blanchot's account, the cadaver is not some inanimate, inert being 
but points to “Someone: the unbearable image and figure of the unique 
becoming nothing in particular" (257). Its unfamiliar presence makes it devoid 
of any significance. One cannot relate it to some graspable existence of being 
in the v/orld. The cadaver can only “ resemble himself". This third person here, 
“himself", does not only designate the person once living, and now dead, but 
points to an impersonal being which embraces both him and something more 
than him. In this way, Blanchot claims that cadaver’s presence is one of 
resemblance, which resembles nothing, but to itself, which cannot be thought 
in terms of inferiority.
That is why no man alive, in fact, bears any resemblance yet.
In the rare instances when a living person shows similitude 
with himself, he only seems to us more remote, closer to a 
dangerous neutral region, astray in himself and like his own 
ghost already: he seems to return no longer having any but an 
echo of life, (p.258)
What the cadaver so insistently reveals is an infinite movement of the 
approach of the other as absolutely other, marking the opening to an outside 
devoid of any human presence, an abyssal movement. The pure exteriority 
does not offer us a relationship of interchangeability between places, it rather 
marks an abyssal relationship and thus limit itself is a crossing towards what 
Blanchot calls the "other night".
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The other night is always the other, and he who senses it 
becomes the other. He who approaches it departs from 
himself, is no longer he who approaches but he who turns 
away, goes hither and yon. (Blanchot: 169)
If there is a limit between the night and the "other night", it can be found 
anywhere in the flow, not at some specific point where one can draw a border 
as such, not here or there. It is a threshold, yes, but one that does not define 
or delimit anything. There is no possible experience of the "other night" as 
such. It is inexhaustible, interminable, always the other. One can search for it 
by exhausting all the possibilities, and one is exhausted by this impossibility of 
exhausting the impossible.
In this sense, the cadaver's presence disrupts the continuity of linear 
time by introducing its uncertainty of a time, which had never been present. 
What is at stake here is the discontinuity that the cadaver confronts us with. 
Upon encountering the dead body one is forcefully exposed to a relation that 
had not been established consciously when that person was still living. But this 
relation cannot be regarded as simply moving from one regime to another, 
from life to death. Death marks the ghostly double that cannot be mastered or 
possessed. The impossibility to overcome death and still to undergo its 
approach causes a crack in the identity. The proximity in distance, virtuality in 
actuality, presence in absence that characterizes death challenges the 
centered self-identity.
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By analogy, we might also recall that a tool when damaged, 
becomes its image. In this case the tool, no longer 
disappearing into its use, appears. This appearance of the 
object is that of resemblance and reflection: the object’s 
double, if you will. The category of art is linked to this 
possibility for objects to “appear,” to surrender, that is, to the 
pure and simple resemblance behind which there is nothing -  
but being. (Blanchot: 258-259)
Blanchot's writings on myth of the Gaze of Orpheus is exemplary at 
this point. According to the myth, Orpheus is allowed to enter the Underworld 
to bring Eurydice back to the light of the day, retrieve her from death, on 
condition that he does not look at her. But along the journey, he does not 
respect the rule and loses Eurydice at the moment he turns back his gaze upon 
her. In Blanchot's account, the disappearance of Eurydice is what Orpheus 
wants to see, not the visibility of her face as familiar but "the foreignness of 
what excludes all intimacy, and wants, not to make her live, but to have living 
in her the plenitude of her death" (Blanchot: 172). Thus Orpheus betrays the 
conditions of his work, but the betrayal is at the same time a necessary 
condition for his work. In this sense, Eurydice appears in the passage by 
disappearing. Again in Blanchot, the gaze of Orpheus that announces the 
disappearance of Eurydice absents him from the scene, by the same 
movement. Orpheus's gaze is a blind- vision that is in contact with the "other 
night" as pure exteriority and the powerlessness of not seeing. Thus the
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threshold that marks the passage between this world and the other where the 
thing becomes image, opening to this outside.
A direct encounter with the subject of the photograph cannot be a 
given of the image. Since the subject is already dead in the photograph, no 
claim of transparency or unmediatedness resolves this tension of such a direct 
confrontation, which cannot take place. In a similar vein, a direct encounter 
with death is an impossibility; in order for it to become possible the person 
should also be dead. The only relation one can establish with death, is by 
taking the de-tour of representation, "an image, whether verbal or visual" 
(Critchley: 108).
The undecidable presence-absence relation that shapes Blanchot's 
conceptualization of the image, is parallel with the double operation that is in 
the very structure of photographic images. According to Siegfried Kracauer, 
photography presents us the fragments of “a disintegrated unity". The moment 
torn from the temporal continuity of the thing photographed becomes 
spatialized. What is then eternalized in the photograph is the spatial 
configuration of this single moment; not the person or event the photograph 
shows, “but the sum of what can be deducted from him or her" (Kracauer: 
431). Furthermore, Kracauer claims that photograph "annihilates the person by 
portraying him or her, and were person and portrayal to converge, the person
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would cease to exist." The photograph reveals the impossibility of the 
repetition of a single occurrence. By evoking a certain absence, which can 
never be present one more time, while being so forcefully present to us in its 
materiality, the photograph denies the fulfillment of a self-sufficient identity. 
Its power resides in, not mummifying the person, but joining death and the 
subject on its surface. The photograph is detached from this originary moment, 
which no longer can be, thus the word origin cannot be appropriate for it. As 
Eduardo Cadava claims, the photograph of a person circulates in society 
without him, recalling his death, belonging to his afterlife, while the person may 
still be living (225).
Blanchot's conceptualization of the image speaks to us of its 
unsustainability. It cannot preserve its presence unless it lets itself be 
appropriated, represented, thereby absenting itself in this gesture. In order to 
prevent the thing projected from “sinking into nothingness", one has to give it 
a material existence, a physical body whose elements would “exist to 
disappear” , “exist to make the thing appear", and "continue to be and 
disappear to maintain the thing as appearance.” The image, brought forward in 
its full materiality, something that can be seen, touched appears by 
disappearing. It silences what lies beneath, to provide a void for it to speak. 
The ambiguity is intrinsic and essential to the image. Something is rendered 
visible to make what disappears appear, something is silenced to make it 
speak.
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Ill
The experience of the punctum, which singularizes the image and 
Blanchot’s conceptualization of the act of reading a piece of work has certain 
correspondences. Recognition of the punctum can be seen as the spectator’s 
reading of the photograph since “ it makes the work become a work, beyond 
the man who produced it” and beyond the cultural determinants. According to 
Blanchot, reading differs from interpretation in the sense that the latter aims 
at “ keeping meaning alive by pursuing it” , whereas the former does not 
operate in the manner of an analysis.
... reading, seeing, hearing the work of art demands more 
ignorance than knowledge. It requires a knowledge endowed 
with an immense ignorance and a gift which is not given ahead 
of time, which has each time to be received and acquired in 
forgetfulness of it, and also lost. (192)
In Blanchot's account, reading opens up a space for a work to become 
what it is. It is not a conscious act to reproduce what had been put forward, 
nor to make something new out of it. It simply lets the work be, affirm itself 
without the writer. The play of punctum, like reading, provides this space for 
the image to communicate itself. This operation is entirely different than that 
of the studium whose function is to make the photograph communicable. Still, 
considering the relation between these two terms, it needs to be pointed here
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that reading does not only take into account the effect of punctum as isolated 
from studium. A radical reading of photographic images, -one that is not 
limited by the analytical techniques of structuralism- would be to explode the 
image from within towards this exteriority, the void, which can never be 
inhabited, thus remains always in the form of an approach.
The photographic image therefore comes only in the form of a 
coming, within the messianism of its “event": photography 
promises that everything may be kept for history, but the 
everything that is kept is the everything that is always already 
in the process of disappearing. What is kept is only the 
promise, the event of the promise. (Cadava 243)
IV
I will not terminate these arguments with a wrap up statement by 
claiming any definite explanation for the experience of photographic images 
which would bring closure to the forces inherent in the medium. One important 
remark to be made here is that meaning can never be interiorized in any 
medium, or object. It is always created and re-created contextually. All 
experience is the experience of this meaning produced by différence, which is 
in turn, deconstructed. It is not something that the photograph preserves in 
itself waiting to be discovered or restored to an original source, but to be 
produced over and over.
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Thinking on photography, is a non-totalizable process, which does not 
reflect upon the past but invents the future. The desire to go beyond the 
framed space of the photograph finds its triggering force in the wound that 
punctum creates. This is the dynamism of the photograph, which otherwise 
seems to lack mobility. The experience, here, is not the representation of an 
experience but the image itself as experience, in endless repetition of its own 
beginning.
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